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In December 2004, the European Union (EU) agreed to open accession talks with Turkey. For many Turks, this was a long-awaited affirmation of Turkey’s European vocation, a project whose roots date to the beginning of the Turkish Republic. Of course, eventual membership in the EU is not assured, and many in Europe object to the prospect of Turkish accession on political, economic, and/or cultural grounds.​[1]​ However, the EU’s decision was a real breakthrough for many reasons, not the least of which is that it stated that Turkey had met the political aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria for membership. This was in sharp contrast to EU pronouncements in 1997, when the Turkish membership bid was rejected because of the shortcomings of democracy in Turkey.
Regardless of the fate of Turkey’s EU bid, there is little doubt that the Turkish state and society have been transformed in recent years by a “political avalanche of democratization.”​[2]​ Although there have been voices calling for political liberalization in Turkey for many years, the immediate impetus for this transformation was the EU’s decision in 1999 to accept Turkish candidacy for membership with the stipulation that Turkey would have to make numerous political reforms to gain eventual entry into the organization. In the wake of that decision, Turkish governments have pushed through a number of reforms in some sensitive areas (e.g. rights for Kurds and Kurdish language, circumscribing the power of the military) that would have been unthinkable just a few years before. One Turkish observer noted that the EU had sparked a “period of profound and momentous change in Turkish history…[that] would have been impossible in the absence of a powerful and highly institutionalized EU anchor in the direction of full membership.”​[3]​ Indeed, the reforms in Turkey, which for years had been a “reluctant democratizer,” can be cited as successful application of political conditionality of the EU and the power of external agents of democratization.​[4]​
Many questions remain about Turkish democracy, however. Many of the reforms are quite recent, and implementation remains a problem. Others worry if they will last beyond the leadership of the current government led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. French Prime Minister Jean Marie Raffarin recently asked, “We are not doubting the good faith of Mr. Erdogan, but to what extent can today or tomorrow’s government make Turkish society embrace Europe’s human rights values? Do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of secularism?”​[5]​ More significantly, one might ask about the degree of support for democratization within the Turkish public and civil society. In 2000, one Turkish writer complained that Turks were making reforms like students who do their homework only because the teacher tells them to do it.​[6]​  In this view, democratization was more imposed from the outside than imbued with Turkish authorship, and it was more an instrumental adaptation to the demands of conditionality than a sincere change based upon acceptance and internalization of democratic norms. Turks were thus arguably responding to the “logic of consequentiality” (do X because you will get Y) rather than the “logic of appropriateness” (do X because it is the right thing to do).​[7]​
This paper addresses this issue by examining the role of forces ‘from below’ within Turkey in the Turkish reform project and the role of the EU in encouraging such forces. As such, it seeks to understand the nexus between external and internal agents of democratization. As noted, if the reforms are more a European than a Turkish project and if they do not have diffuse support among the population or benefit from a sense of domestic ownership, one would expect both the accession process to be more difficult  and the reforms to be poorly institutionalized. On the other hand, to the extent that the EU is able to work with Turks and foster acceptance of democratic norms and empower democratically-oriented forces within Turkey, one would be far more sanguine about democratic consolidation in Turkey. 

The Interface of International and Domestic Agents of Democratization

Democratization has become a prominent sub-field within comparative politics. The first ‘wave’ of the democratization literature de-emphasized the role of external factors in democracy promotion,​[8]​ but, by the mid-1990s, there was renewed interest in whether and how international factors affected processes of domestic democratization. Much of this literature was rooted in the experience of the EU, which was viewed as a powerful force that helped foster democratization in East-Central Europe.​[9]​ Various propositions were put forward to help us understand how international factors help spur democratization. These included a diffusion effect, an international zeitgeist, socialization that help spread democratic norms, and use of political conditionality. Still, scholars suggested that the apparent cause-and-effect relationship between the EU and democratization was “under-theorized” and “more assumed than proven.”​[10]​ In the Turkish context, Nathalie Tocci, while noting that the EU has played an important role, asks if the EU is better understood as a “trigger” for reforms (meaning it sparked them) or if it is merely an “anchor,” important mainly insofar as it gives support for domestic actors that generated the reform process.​[11]​
In the broader comparative context, part of the problem was that not all states reacted similarly to this supposed zeitgeist, socialization, or use of political conditionality. Even within Europe, some states remained “reluctant democratizers” (e.g. Slovakia, Croatia, Romania, Latvia), meaning that they did not rush to meet all the demands of the EU and put up some resistance to political liberalization even when offered the alluring carrot of membership in the EU. Eventually, many of these states did succumb to the demands of EU conditionality, but one key point is that EU’s democratization agenda was filtered through a state’s domestic politics.​[12]​
What does this mean in practice? One crucial factor, according to one set of writers, is that external agents need to foster “transnational networks” with elites, parties, and non-governmental organizations within the targeted state. These alliances would be particularly important in states where more authoritarian-oriented elites had little incentive to democratize. In addition to providing resources to democratically-oriented opposition groups, they would also help educate citizens in democratic norms and practice and thereby create more support and legitimacy for political liberalization. The result is a “boomerang effect” in which elites resistant to change are caught in a “pincer” as pressure comes about both from outside from domestic actors.​[13]​  
In essence, the issue is the development of civil society, which is generally assumed to be an invaluable force for democratization in much of the literature.​[14]​ To the extent that outside agents can bolster a state’s civil society, the prospects for democratization improve. A caveat, of course, is that the external agents must be seen as authoritative and legitimate and that the norms they promote must have some resonance with pre-existing traditions in the target state—what Checkel calls a “cultural match.”​[15]​ The more the norm matches preexisting values, interests, practices, and identity and the less it has domestic or even regional competitors, the easier it will find adherents within the targeted state and the harder it will be for entrenched elites to oppose the norm since it is not so much “foreign” but instead a reflection of the state’s own culture and values. In the case of the EU, there are numerous programs and opportunities available for interaction with civil society in aspiring members. In Central and Eastern Europe, one report suggested that the EU’s democracy programs were of “considerable value” for the development of civil society, which is turn played a “crucial role in the process of democratization.”​[16]​
Transnational networks are relatively easy to identify, even quantify. It is far more difficult, however, to pinpoint the precise motivations for democratization. In other words, why does a state or actors within a state respond to pressures and/or blandishments to democratize? This question dogs much of the literature, and in a specific case may be hard to illuminate. One might argue that this is not crucial, as all that matters is whether the targeted state changes course. However, if state elites only acquiesce to the norm, they may create only “Potemkin” institutions that meet some formal criteria but do little to see that policies are implemented in a manner that really brings about substantive change.​[17]​ 
In general, one can make a distinction between internalization of democratic norms as opposed to changes rooted in instrumental, utilitarian calculations. As noted, this corresponds to the “logic of appropriateness” and the “logic of consequentiality.” The former would stress genuine change in values and beliefs, fostered by socialization, (re)education, and learning, often thanks to involvement with international actors. In other words, it occurs in light of a “rational assessment of morally valid arguments” and requires actors to transcend a particular contextual rationality that heretofore had worked against political liberalization.​[18]​  Put simply, the expectation, in the EU context, is that EU sponsored aid, training programs, “twinning projects,” and exchanges will provide a social influence and make good democrats out of those who had previously not lived in a democratic society or held democratic values. More so than in the case of political conditionality, such efforts aim to foster democracy ‘from below’ and engage non-state actors in the democratization project. 
The “logic of consequentiality,” on the other hand, reflects the demands of political conditionality: Do X to get Y. In the case of the EU, the Y could be aid or trade benefits, but the evidence suggests that it is the prospect of membership that acts as a real catalyst to spur political change. There is no assumption that values or core beliefs of previously “reluctant democrats” will change. Moreover, to the extent that political conditionality appeals primarily to existing political elites—those with the ability to make and implement the required changes—it works more through inter-governmental material bargaining. There is less emphasis, at least in the short term, on broader engagement with non-state actors. 




After a military coup in 1980, Turkey returned to civilian rule in 1983. The 1982 Constitution, however, was drafted under the aegis of the military regime and in many respects reflected its authoritarian and statist values. It gave the state sizeable discretion to restrict freedom of expression and association and gave the military an institutionalized role in many aspects of policymaking and in the judicial system. In addition to codified law, the practice of torture and ill-treatment of the Kurdish minority marred Turkey’s human rights record throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Despite some reforms in the 1990s (e.g. changes to the anti-terror law, amendments to expand freedom of association, ratification of UN and European conventions prohibiting torture), Turkey’s democratic shortcomings would be consistently noted by the EU and thwarted its aspirations to join the organization.​[20]​ In the political science lexicon, the “costs of compliance”—especially on issues such as rights for the Kurdish minority and limiting the military’s political role—were deemed intolerably high by the Turkish elite, especially when the EU was not putting the highly valued carrot of membership on the table for Turkey.
As noted, in 1999 at its Helsinki Summit, the EU formally declared Turkey a candidate member, but it was clear that Turkey would have to make progress on a number of fronts in order to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, especially with regard to political and civic freedoms, minority rights, abolishment of the death penalty and torture, and stripping the military of its political prerogatives. This decision of the EU would prove to be momentous. If before there had been half-hearted reform efforts and only superficial debate on what EU membership would mean, the 1999 Helsinki decision would provide an “irreversible impetus” to the reform process.​[21]​ 
As early as March 2000, the government advanced a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis designed to help meet EU criteria. This program proposed 89 new laws and 94 amendments to existing laws. There was, however, opposition to some proposed measures from the nationalist Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP, Nationalist Action Party), which was then a member of the governing coalition, and from certain voices within the military. Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the MHP, for example, declared that Kurdish language education and broadcasting “are not going to happen” and another MHP deputy, responding to European concern on human rights issues, suggested that “issues that go against the fiber of our country are not matters open to discussion.”​[22]​ Ziya Onis suggested in the immediate wake of Helsinki that Turkish leaders did not fully realize how the EU requirements would interfere with Turkey’s domestic politics and that human rights would become the sine qua non for entry.​[23]​
Nonetheless, substantial reforms would occur, as by the end of 2004, nine reform or “harmonization” packages made their way through the Turkish National Assembly. Three of these would be under the left-right coalition government (2000-2002) and six under the AKP government, elected in November 2002. These reforms would dramatically alter the Turkish political landscape, and would include 34 constitutional amendments in 2001 and ten more in 2004.​[24]​ Highlights of the reforms include narrowing the basis for which the state could freedom rights and liberties (Article 13 and 14 of the Constitution), more liberal provisions for freedom of assembly (Article 34), limiting punishment for insulting state institutions (Article 159), elimination of the death penalty (finally abolished for all crimes in 2004), abolition of the State Security Courts, amendments to strip the military of positions on state councils, a new and more liberal Law on Associations in July 2004 (especially relevant for civil society groups), and changes to the notorious Article 313 of the Penal Code that had been liberally applied against Islamists and Kurds for “inciting ethnic or religious hatred.” The EU responded by granting Turkey an Accession Partnership in 2001 (revised in March 2003), and has been closely monitoring and advising on reform efforts. While implementation of some of these reforms (e.g. especially on use of Kurdish and ending torture and prisoner abuse) is still an issue, the reforms did go far enough for the EU in December 2004 to give a green light for accession talks.
With the exception of some in the MHP leadership, these reforms enjoyed wide support at the elite level. One account suggests that the 2001 amendments were the product of “intense negotiations and “compromises” among all parties in parliament and that this was a “good omen” for democratization in Turkey.​[25]​ The military, particularly under the leadership of Chief of Staff Hilmi Ozkok,  has also acceded to the need to make substantial reforms to gain entry into the EU. As for the AKP, which is a recent incarnation of previously-banned Islamist parties, Avci suggests that it has pushed through reforms not just for instrumentalist reasons but as part of moral imperative, with Prime Minister Erdogan declaring in July 2004 that Turkey would push ahead with reforms even if the EU failed to open accession talks with Turkey.​[26]​
However, it is less clear how deeply the commitment to reform is within the Turkish public and to what extent Turkish civil society is involved in the process. True, some civic groups—notably TUSIAD (Turk Sanyicileri ve Isadamlari Dernegi—Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association)—had long been advocates of political reform​[27]​, and there is evidence to suggest that support for Turkish membership in the EU among the public has increased over time.​[28]​ However, the speed with which these reforms were initially proposed may give one pause, given the fact that many of these measures (especially on rights for the Kurdish language) were deemed impolitic or impossible literally months before they were put on the table. Should one assume that Turkish elites were simply “following orders,” doing what was expected of them by the EU, or was “learning” at work, meaning that “behaviour changes as actors question original implicit theories underlying programs and examine their value”?​[29]​ Perhaps the latter was true, but one might retort that it was a very quick learning curve for many.
This line of questioning, while interesting, is not our focus, however. Our questions are to what extent (if any) these reforms were demand-driven from below and how the EU has engaged with Turkish civil society in the reform process. 





Turkish civil society has traditionally been portrayed as weak, passive, and controlled or channeled by the state through corporatist structures. Some would attribute this to vestiges of Ottoman political culture; others would point to the bureaucratic-authoritarian nature of the early Turkish republic.​[30]​ In any event, the stereotype was that Turks looked toward a devlet baba (“father-state”) rather than to social self-organization to provide leadership and essential services and that there was little genuine grassroots mobilization to underpin Turkey’s unstable democratic institutions.
This stereotype was always a bit of a caricature, as Turkey had thousands of different organizations and vakiflar (foundations) and one might even say that some of the more unruly elements in Turkish civil society contributed to the instability that led to a military coup in 1980. By the 1990s, after a period of substantial economic liberalization, Turkish civil society became more visible and vocal, often demanding greater political liberalization. Islamic organizations and business associations took the lead in inserting themselves into the political life of the country, with the latter deeply committed to democratization and the country’s European ambitions.​[31]​ Kurdish, Alevi, environmental, feminist and other groups appeared on the scene, and the Global Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 provided an opportunity for Turkish civic groups to act in a very visible manner.​[32]​ Five labor and employer organizations formed a civil initative (Besli Sivil Insiyatif).​[33]​  Still, on a number of indicators (e.g. membership, funding, levels of inter-personal trust), Turkish civil society was “frail,” less developed than that of advanced industrialized states.​[34]​ 
The earthquakes of 1999 would be a significant event for Turkish civil society, as various secular and Islamic groups played a leading role in disaster relief when the state proved incapable of mobilizing quickly and effectively enough. Some suggested that the entire state-dominated system collapsed in the wake of the earthquake and that the disaster had created a new “faultline” that would have marked repercussions in political life.​[35]​ Despite these hopes, however, the state did rebound a bit, asserting control over some groups and co-opting others, so that there was no sustained movement from below that threatened state authority.​[36]​
However, it was in this context—one in which civil society was more activated than ever before and the state was more on the defensive—that the door to Europe opened for Turkey in December 1999. As noted, this was followed by a wave of political reform in the country, reforms that were rejected by political elites just years before.  No doubt, the EU provided a necessary push for reforms, creating a supportive international environment and a “virtuous” as opposed to a “vicious” circle in which half-hearted reforms failed to generate momentum for broad democratic consolidation.​[37]​ At issue, however, is whether and how the EU has gone beyond pressure on elites and forged transnational networks with Turkish actors to push for these reforms, strengthen their domestic content and legitimacy, and spread acceptance of democratic norms amongst the Turkish citizenry. 
No doubt, there has been a flurry of activity in Turkey by the EU and other external organizations with a democratization mandate (e.g. the Open Society Institute [Soros Foundation]). As citizens of a candidate country, Turks can apply to a host of EU programs for grants, exchanges, and training. Both the Turkish political elite and NGO (non-governmental organization) sector are in close contact with their counterparts in Brussels and in member state capitals. While some noted that EU aid to Turkey in the 1990s was rather meager when compared to aid to countries in post-communist Europe,​[38]​ EU aid has become more substantial since the Helsinki summit. For 2000-2006, total EU assistance is expected to be almost three billion Euros, a third of which would be pre-accession oriented grants. Moreover, financial assistance is foreseen to double between 2004 and 2006. The EU envisions that its monies will be more or less equally distributed to investment in regulatory infrastructure, regional development, and institution-building. It is in the last category (which includes twinning projects to assist the Turkish bureaucracy) that non-governmental organizations can play a role in “supporting initiatives aimed at the consolidation and further development of democratic practices, the rule of law, human rights, equality for women and men and the protection of minorities.”​[39]​
Certainly, there is a myriad of civic groups in Turkey that could benefit from EU largesse and political support—as of 2004, there were over 100,000 associations.​[40]​ Many prominent business, academic, and human rights organizations—including TUSIAD, IKV (Iktisadi Kalkinma Vakfi,  Economic Development Foundation), Insan Haklari Dernegi (Human Rights Association), Turk Tarih Vakfi (Turkish History Foundation), Turkiye Ucuncu Sektor Vakfi (Third Sector Foundation of Turkey), Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, and ARI Movement have launched many projects with EU partners, lobbied for Turkish accession in Brussels, and put pressure on the Turkish government to adopt various reforms. One hundred and seventy-five NGOs formed a consortium, European Movement (Avrupa Hareketi) in 2002, and the IKV took the lead in launching The Turkey Platform, which by 2004 included 269 NGOs that lobbied for Turkish membership in addition to pressuring Ankara to make necessary reforms for EU accession.​[41]​ Universities and academic centers play an important role in this process, with thirteen different European Documentation Centres established in Turkey to provide information and to encourage research and education on the EU. Anecdotally, one could argue that there is more interest in EU Studies in Turkey than anywhere elsewhere else in Europe.  
While these numbers are impressive, one might still be skeptical. Simsek insists that that civil society is more of a slogan than an important political reality and that the impact of these groups, for various structural reasons, remains “trivial.”​[42]​ One might also note that membership in most groups is quite low and that their resources are often very limited.​[43]​ Thus, it is worth looking a little more closely at what Turkish NGOs are doing to further the broader ‘Europeanization’ agenda.
Without question, there has been a real effort by the EU to engage NGOs in the Turkish reform process. While most of the aid monies goes to programs to help with the Turkish government, the NGO sector has also been involved in numerous exchanges, seminars, conferences, and partnerships with Europeans. The EU’s Civil Society Development Programme’s  (CSDP) aims to boost NGO capacity in a number of areas (e.g. project design and implementation, fundraising, communication, employment) and to “develop capacity for citizen’s initiatives and dialogue, domestically and abroad, and to help establish a more balanced relationship between citizens and the state, thereby contributing to the maturing of democratic practice.” It oversees a program with five components: local civic initiatives, Greek-Turkish civic dialogue,​[44]​ a trade union dialogue, police professionalism, and development of chambers. All stress cooperation with international partners, and for 2003-2004 were funded with eight million Euros.​[45]​ Funding for civic initiatives has included various projects, some apolitical (e.g. a bird watching program, civic engineering), but many that touched clearly on political themes (e.g. support to the Women Solidarity Foundation, Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association [an Alevi group], and the Circassian Cultural Association of Adana [an advocate for an ethnic minority group]).​[46]​ Other EU programs stress human rights development and education, and in June 2003 the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights launched a competition for funding for micro-projects on issues of torture, anti-discrimination, and good governance. Thirteen projects were given a total of 600,000 Euro. In 2004, the EU launched another project to improve NGO-public sector cooperation, which had been envisioned as a priority in a 2003 reform when the Ministry of Interior formed a department for outreach to civic associations. Other EU-financed programs include a human rights photographic exhibition and a program to provide human rights material to Turkish youth.​[47]​ 
True, these projects are not large in Euro terms, particularly compared to assistance to the Turkish government, but this external support is vital for more local, non-business oriented groups that do not have powerful Turkish patrons. Moreover, as two activists from the ARI Movement note, cooperation with European and other actors have bolstered the legitimacy and credibility of domestic NGOs, as well as providing a benchmark of sorts (e.g. comparing the status of women in Europe with that in Turkey) that also helps activists make a case for reform.​[48]​




Parallel with the caricature of Turkish civil society, many assumed that Turkish political culture was a reflection of the Kemalist state: nationalistic and authoritarian, with a preference for order over broadening individual rights. By the late 1990s, however, survey research would show that although on some measures (e.g. inter-personal trust, preference for order over freedom) Turks scored “low,” there was broader acceptance that democracy was desirable and a majority of Turks rejected the idea that rule by the military or a strong leader that would not have to bother with parliament or elections would be desirable.​[53]​ True, these questions did not get into specifics about what democratization would mean in the Turkish context, but, at least in the abstract, one could point to the presence of a basic, diffuse support for democracy among Turks.
Obviously, since 1999 democratization has risen to the forefront of the country’s political agenda. Many issues that were previously not discussed or considered out of bounds politically have been in recent years staples in the Turkish media. What has been the public’s reaction?  Do Turks support the broad swathe of demands (e.g. rights for minorities, greater freedom of expression, abolition of the death penalty) put forward by the EU as a prerequisite for accession? Are EU conditions tapping into demands ‘from below’? Is it accurate, as one study argues, that the recent reforms in Turkey are a “natural outcome of public support for further democratization?”​[54]​ 
A national survey conducted in May and June 2002 sheds interesting light on these questions. This survey was designed to probe attitudes toward the EU and EU demands on the Turkish government.​[55]​ In general, Turks seem positively disposed toward the prospect of membership, with strong majority of Turks (64%) backing EU membership, and 58% expecting their lives to improve as a result of EU membership. Interestingly, however, Turks exhibit the lowest level of knowledge about the EU of any (then)candidate country, and a majority (58%) knew nothing about the Copenhagen Criteria. 
As for political reforms, the survey found that, in the abstract, Turks approved of a number of basic democratic rights and for rights for ethnic minorities. Data are displayed in Table 1. More interesting, however, is the fact that Turks exhibited more lukewarm feelings on many of the political reforms that have actually been adopted. Data for these are displayed in Table 2. In particular, one seeks that a plurality of respondents were against reforms to give greater rights to non-Turkish (read: Kurdish) speakers and a majority were against abolition of the death penalty. Further questions, noted on Table 2, reveal that a majority of Turks would refuse to endorse these reforms, even if it would cost Turkey EU membership. 
How does one interpret these findings? One explanation may be that while there is general support for democracy and rights in the abstract, when respondents are given a context that relates to controversial reform projects in Turkey, there is less enthusiasm for reforms. In part, one could suggest, this reflects the above-mentioned preference for order over freedom, and that Turks are less supportive of democracy and minority rights when they recognize the possible trade-offs involving in political liberalization. Second, one could argue that the questions in Table 2 tap into Turkish national feeling, particularly the oft-mentioned Sevres syndrome,​[56]​ and that Turks are thus reluctant to “follow orders” of Brussels as this raises, mentally if nothing else perhaps, the “costs of compliance.” The three questions at the bottom of the table—which squarely indicate what conditionality means in practice—are particularly revealing, and provide reason for skepticism that Turks are wholeheartedly pro-EU. In addition, it should give pause to those who claim that many aspects of the reform programs tap into a consensus at the mass level for reform, especially on the most sensitive issues in Turkish politics. In other words, there is little to suggest some of the most basic reforms demanded by Europe—and this would include provisions for the Kurdish language, as minority rights are integral to the Copenhagen Criteria—are driven ‘from below.’ Without pressure from the outside, it is highly doubtful that such reforms would have been adopted.
However, the most important point, perhaps, is that they have been adopted despite lack of support from the mass public. One might suggest that this re-affirms what Schimmelfennig et al noted, that Turkish society is fundamentally weak.​[57]​ While one might be tempted to argue that this means that reforms will not be consolidated or could possibly be repealed, the fact that the AKP overwhelmingly won in local elections in 2004, retains high support among the public at-large, and that there are no serious calls for Turkey to pull out of the accession process, suggests that the broader public is at least resigned to the fact that the reforms are in place. Moreover, one should mention that the survey reveals that most Turks (52%) see EU membership as a means for economic development and 30% list freedom to travel in Europe as plus of EU membership, whereas only 28% mentioned a stronger democracy as a positive of EU membership. Put differently, the materialist incentives provided by the EU may ultimately convince Turks that the political reforms are worth the “cost.”


Table 1    Support for Rights in Abstract
Q: Should the rights and freedoms listed below exist under any circumstances and 
at all times or could some these be restricted at times depending on the circumstances?

	 Exist at all times	Can be restricted
Right to equal treatment under the law	91	7
Freedom of conscience and religion	90	8
Freedom of correspondence and communication	85	13
Right not to be tortured	83	16
Freedom of expression	74	25
Right to use one’s native language	74	25





Table 2  Support for EU’s Democratization Program
Q: To what extent do you approve of the following adjustments necessary for 
Turkey’s accession to the EU?

	Not Approve	Uncertain	Approve
Establish conditions for freedom of thought and expression	7	10	82
Establish conditions for freedom of conscience and religion	9	14	77
Decrease the role of the military in Turkish politics	32	18	50
Abolish laws which prevent broadcasting in one’s native language	47	12	41
Abolish laws which prevent receiving education in one’s native language	47	11	42
Abolish the death penalty	52	11	38
If the only condition to join EU was to abolish restrictions on broadcasting in one’s native language (% of Kurdish speakers)	56 (27)	5(4)	39 (69)
If the only condition to join EU was to abolish restrictions on education in one’s native language (% Kurdish speakers)	37(29)	5(3)	58(68)
If the only condition to join EU was to replace death penalty with aggravated life imprisonment	33	5	62






	How should one evaluate the role of forces “from below” in this reform process, particularly given the very visible role of the EU? Should one agree with Tocci, who argues that it has been a “process of change largely driven by endogenous factors?”​[58]​ Certainly, debates over reform in Turkey do pre-date the Helsinki decision, and the rise of the pro-EU AKP (and the defeat of the anti-EU MHP) has created a domestic constellation of forces more conducive to reform. This electoral outcome, of course, is directly attributable to Turkish voters, not the EU, and, as the experience with Central and East European “reluctant democratizers” shows, the EU is not powerful by itself to remove the most recalcitrant elites or to help them to “learn” to be good democrats.​[59]​
	However, the EU is a central—even towering—figure in the Turkish reform process. The timing of the reforms—as well as their content—speaks to the power of the EU as a “trigger” for the reforms. Again, the fact that so many reforms that in the mid-1990s were deemed imprudent, impolitic, or dangerous have been adopted so quickly in the midst of a sea-change in Turkish politics—one-third of the constitution has been amended—indicates that something has dramatically changed the calculation of the Turkish decision-makers. With all due respect to actors in Turkish civil society, we are not witnessing a revolution “from below.” Two Turkish civil society activists concede that prior to 1999 the work of civil society groups failed to produce “concrete results.” It would be, in their view, the “political discipline provided by the EU prospect” that has changed the social and political dynamic to the benefit of pro-reform civil society groups, whose agenda has enjoyed much more success since 1999.​[60]​ 
The issue of criminalizing adultery—which was proposed by the government in August 2004—is particularly instructive. Despite the past efforts of the aforementioned Womens’ Coalition and other groups, the AKP government—perhaps to satisfy a culturally conservative constituency—advanced this proposal in the new Penal Code, perhaps thinking that it would escape European scrutiny. Europe did object, however, questioning if Erdogan had truly shed his Islamist past. Turkey’s European bid hung in the balance, and the Turkish National Assembly, under EU pressure, hastily passed a Penal Code without the adultery measure, prompting some to conclude that Ankara had succumbed to EU diktat. 
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